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Abstract 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention limits the jurisdiction 
of the Centre to legal disputes arising directly out of an 
investment between a contracting state and a ‘national’ of another 
contracting state. Treaty protection, that is, is conditioned by the 
recognition of the ‘foreign’ nature of an investment, by way of 
either a place of incorporation or a control test. In practice, 
arbitrators recently had to elaborate on the significance of 
‘nationality’ and to establish what constitutes a ‘foreign’ 
investment. Arbitral tribunals have had to consider cases 
opposing host-states to their own nationals as well as to foreign 
investors who allegedly did not have the nationality of the other 
Contracting Party. This comment compares facts and corporate 
structures in Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine and TSA Spectrum v. 
Argentina Republic as well as the differences in BIT provisions 
explaining the tribunals’ respective findings. Two questions are 
also considered. First, does ICSID arbitrators’ jurisdiction 
encompass lifting the corporate veil in the absence of an explicit 
authorisation to do so in the Convention? Second, 
notwithstanding ‘BIT-shopping’ discussions which overall remain 
policy-oriented, should the real source of authority of the 
investment be looked for in claims opposing states to their own 
nationals? 
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Article 25 of the ICSID Convention limits the jurisdiction 
of the Centre to legal disputes arising directly out of an 
investment between a contracting state and a ‘national’ of another 
contracting state. Treaty protection, that is, is conditioned by the 
recognition of the ‘foreign’ nature of an investment, by way of 
either a place of incorporation or a control test. In practice, 
arbitrators recently had to elaborate on the significance of 
‘nationality’ and to establish what constitutes a ‘foreign’ 
investment. Arbitral tribunals have had to consider cases 
opposing host-states to their own nationals as well as to foreign 
investors who allegedly did not have the nationality of the other 
Contracting Party. Amongst the first ICSID decisions illustrating 
this corporate nationality paradox, Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine and 
TSA Spectrum v. Argentina Republic provide diverging findings 
opposing BIT-grounded arguments with considerations of what 
arbitrators eventually called “common sense”.1  
The Tokios Tokelés decision, on the one hand, considered 
whether a state might legitimately be involved in an investment 
dispute before an ICSID tribunal against one of its own nationals. 
The TSA Spectrum tribunal, on the other hand, was more generally 
faced with the so-called ‘BIT-shopping’ practices consisting in 
incorporating entities in foreign countries to benefit from specific 
regimes. In both claims, arbitrators were therefore had to 
establish the nationality of the investors, and interestingly 
provided elements of discussion as to whether the place of 
incorporations test (legal situs) should prevail over a more 
constraining control test (controlling nationality) amounting to a 
corporate veil lifting procedure. 
This comment compares facts and corporate structures in 
both cases as well as the differences in BIT provisions explaining 
the tribunals’ respective findings. Two questions are also 
formulated. First, does ICSID arbitrators’ jurisdiction encompass 
lifting the corporate veil in the absence of an explicit 
authorisation to do so in the Convention? Second, 
notwithstanding ‘BIT-shopping’ discussions which overall remain 
policy-oriented, should the real source of authority of the 
investment be looked for in claims opposing states to their own 
nationals? Although the arbitral tribunal in Tokios Tokelés might 
have missed an opportunity to elaborate on control-based 
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Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5   
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nationality tests, TSA Spectrum furthered the interpretation of the 
notion of ‘nationality’ to identify the real source of authority of 
the investment in potentially fraudulent claims. Overall, 
comparing both decisions suggests that increased attention might 
be granted in the future to questions of nationality under ICSID 
arbitrations. 
 
The facts 
Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine provided the first opportunity for 
an ICSID tribunal to address an issue of jurisdiction in a dispute 
opposing a host-state to a corporation owned and controlled by 
some of its nationals. Tokios Tokelės (the claimant) was 
established in 1989 under the laws of Lithuania. In 1994, Tokios 
invested $170,000 in Taki Spravy, a wholly owned subsidiary 
established under the laws of Ukraine, in which it reinvested its 
profits (more than $6,5 million between 1994 and 2002). Tokios’ 
investment in Ukraine fell under the protection of the 1994 
Ukraine-Lithuania BIT, Article 1(1) of which defines ‘investment’ 
as “every kind of asset invested by an investor of one Contracting 
Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party in accordance 
with the laws and regulations of the latter”.  
Tokios held that the respondent engaged in 2002 in a series 
of unjustified actions which adversely affected the investment, 
and initiated ICSID proceedings. Ukraine (the respondent), 
however, refused to grant Tokios the benefit of the BIT 
protection. Although the place of incorporation of the entity left 
no doubt as to the claimant’s nationality,2 Ukraine questioned the 
origin of Tokios’ controllers. It maintained that Tokios, being 
owned and controlled predominantly by Ukrainian nationals, was 
not a “genuine entity” of Lithuania because it had “no substantial 
business activities” in Lithuania and maintained its effective siège 
social in Ukraine, so that the claimant was “in terms of economic 
substance, a Ukrainian investor in Lithuania, not a Lithuanian 
investor in Ukraine”.3 Emphasising that a finding of jurisdiction 
would be “tantamount to allowing Ukrainian nationals to pursue 
international arbitration against their own government” in a 
manner “inconsistent with the object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention”, the respondent therefore asked the tribunal to 
                                                     
2
 Tokios Tokelés, Decision on Jurisdiction (2004)  at 21 
3
 Nationals of Ukraine owned ninety-nine percent of the outstanding shares 
of Tokios and comprised two-thirds of its management, Ibid. at 21 
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‘pierce the corporate veil’ by disregarding the claimant’s state of 
incorporation and to determine its controlling nationality.4 The 
claimant, by contrast, asserted that Taki Spravy should be treated 
as a national of another Contracting State on the basis that it was 
“a wholly owned subsidiary of Tokios Tokelės […] created 
expressly for the purpose of realizing investments by Tokios 
Tokelės in the territory of Ukraine” and characterised by “the 
close and extensive measure of control exercised by Tokios 
Tokelės over its subsidiary”.5 
The facts in TSA Spectrum can also be recalled. TSI, a 
company registered in the Netherlands, wholly owned its 
subsidiary (TSA) incorporated in Argentina since 1996 to 
administrate a radio under the auspices of a 15 years concession 
contract. TSA, as an ‘investment’ of TSI, therefore fell under the 
protection of the Netherlands - Argentine BIT 1992, Article 1 of 
which indicates that for the purposes of the Agreement 
‘investments’ shall comprise “every kind of asset invested by an 
investor of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party”. TSA filed a request for ICSID arbitration 
following a decree of the National Commission of 
Telecommunications of the Argentine Republic (CNC) 
terminating the concession contract while making clear that CNC 
would operate the installations and assets that were the object of 
the Contract.6 
Argentina (the respondent) denied the benefits of the BIT 
to TSA. It claimed that the parent company (TSI) was created in 
the Netherlands in 1996, five days before the establishment of its 
subsidiary (TSA) in Argentina, with the sole purpose to invest in a 
concession under the undue protection of the BIT.7 The 
respondent argued that the claimant failed to prove that TSI was 
“genuinely controlled by investors of the other Contracting 
Party” because of (i) the lack of Dutch citizens in the 
establishment of TSA and in its board of directors which 
consisted of French citizens until 2002 and Argentine citizens 
from 2002; (ii) the difference between the corporate capital of the 
“controlling” and the “controlled” corporations; (iii) TSI’s 
corporate seat being registered at the same address as 225 other 
corporations suggested that the head office did not effectively 
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5
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2007  at 16 
6
 TSA Spectrum v Argentina  at 9 
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exist; (iv) doubts about TSI’s corporate activities were expressed. 
In the absence of proof that the investor was a national of the 
Netherlands by way of control, Argentina contended that TSI - 
rather than a genuine parent company - only represented “a 
vehicle company without any real control over TSA, used by the 
true controllers of TSA to carry out their investment while 
benefiting from the BIT”.8 Finally, the respondent argued that 
TSA violated the general principles of law, since its investment 
was allegedly related to fraud and bribery, so that the tribunal had 
“competence and also an obligation to prevent TSA from 
benefiting from the rights granted by the BIT”.9 
The claimant, by contrast, contended that TSA was entitled 
to BIT protection for several reasons. First, TSA had the 
nationality of “the Contracting State party to the dispute”, given 
that it was incorporated in Argentina since 1996. Answering the 
‘genuine control’ requirement put forward by Argentina, it 
emphasised that TSA was wholly owned by TSI and therefore 
met the “control” criterion in the Protocol to the BIT provided 
that it was controlled, directly or indirectly, by a national of the 
Netherlands, regardless of where it is located.10 Overall, the 
claimant added that there was no necessity to look for the 
nationality of the “ultimate controller”, since there was no such 
requirement in the BIT.11 
Legal rationale and BITs interpretation 
Establishing foreign control was essential to a finding of 
jurisdiction in both cases. Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, 
indeed, specifies that as a rule “the jurisdiction of the Centre shall 
extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, 
between a Contracting State […] and a national of another 
Contracting State”. This has practical implication, since in both 
cases the subsidiaries - being registered under the laws of the 
host-states - were in theory local entities engaged into local 
activities and therefore not entitled to protection under the 
ICSID Convention.  That being said, and in order to take into 
account the requirement by many states that FDI shall be realised 
through local entities subject to local regulation, an exception is 
considered. Article 25(2)(b) ICSID stipulates that the term of 
‘National of another Contracting State’ shall include “any juridical 
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person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to 
the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the 
parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another 
Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention”.12 Such an 
exception, therefore, allowed the recognition of the locally 
incorporated subsidiaries as falling under ‘foreign control’, and 
constituted an essential source of authority for the purpose of 
establishing the law applicable to the Tokios Tokelés and TSA 
Spectrum disputes. 
‘Foreign control’, accordingly, had to be established by way 
of the respective BIT provisions attached to the claims. In Tokios 
Tokelés, first, Article 1(2) of the Ukraine – Lithuania BIT defined 
foreign investors as any nationals or entities established in the 
territories of the contracting parties in conformity with their laws and 
regulations; as well as “any entity or organization established 
under the law of any third State which is, directly or indirectly, 
controlled by nationals of that Contracting Party or by entities 
having their seat in the territory of that Contracting Party; it being 
understood that control requires a substantial part in the 
ownership”.13 In TSA, then, Article 1-(b) of the Argentina – 
Netherland BIT specified that ‘investor’ comprised with regard to 
either Contracting Party “natural persons having the nationality of 
that Contracting Party”, “legal persons constituted under the law of 
that Contracting Party and actually doing business under the laws in 
force in any part of the territory of that Contracting Party in 
which a place of effective management is situated”, and “ legal 
persons, wherever located, controlled, directly or indirectly, by nationals 
of that Contracting Party”.14 
Therefore, while foreign control conditioned treaty 
protections, the former could be established on the ground of the 
place of incorporation of the foreign investor (legal situs) as well 
as from the nationality of the controller (controlling nationality). 
The choice between legal situs and controlling nationality, accordingly, 
forced arbitrators to choose between two different thresholds. 
Relying on the place of incorporation, on the one hand, was a 
straight forward procedure. Establishing the controlling 
nationality, by contrast, implied having recourse to a corporate veil 
lifting procedure. 
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 ICSID, Convention, Regulations and Rules, ICSID/15/Rev.1 (January 
2003 ), emphasis added 
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 Emphasis added 
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 TSA Spectrum v Argentina  at 21 
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The tribunals’ findings 
The Tokios Tokelés and TSA tribunals followed two 
different approaches to the ‘foreign control’ provision.  
Recognising Tokios as a “thing of real legal existence” 
founded on the laws and regulations of Lithuania,15 the Tokios 
Tokelés tribunal established ‘foreign control’ under article 25(2)(b) 
by interpreting ‘nationality’ by reference to “the generally 
accepted (albeit implicit) rule” followed in many ICSID cases 
“that the nationality of a corporation is determined on the basis 
of its siège social or place of incorporation”.16 The arbitrators, in 
addition, suggested that as an exception to the rationale provided 
in Article 25(1), the ‘agreed’ nature of the recognition by the 
contracting states of a local corporation as a national of the other 
contracting state would suffice to establish the unquestionable 
nature of the place of incorporation criterion.17 The mutual 
consent of the parties, it held, accordingly expanded ICSID 
jurisdiction over the case and rendered the veil lifting groundless. 
More importantly, the arbitrators emphasised the absence of 
primacy of the controlling nationality over the place of 
incorporation test. Indeed, while the respondent interpreted 
controlling nationality as an authoritative criteria designed to 
‘deny’ the investor the benefits of the BIT, the tribunal 
considered the test as an alternative intended to ‘extend’ the 
benefits of the BIT to additional investors rather than as a 
necessary requirement.18  
The Tokios Tokelés tribunal, furthermore, cited fraud as a 
determinant factor triggering recourse to the controlling 
nationality test. Citing Barcelona Traction, it suggested that the veil-
                                                     
15
 Tokios Tokelés, Decision on Jurisdiction (2004)  at 29 
16
 Ibid. at 42. The decision also states “ICSID tribunals have uniformly 
adopted the test of incorporation or seat rather than control when 
determining the nationality of a juridical person”, citing Kaiser Bauxite 
Company v. Jamaica  (1975) , SOABI v. Senegal, Decision on 
Jurisdiction  (1984), Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela  (2001); at 49 citing Wena Hotels Ltd. 
v. Arab Republic of Egypt (2002) 
17
 Ibid. at 44, The decision states: “Article 25(2)(b) provides that parties can, 
by agreement, depart from the general rule that a corporate entity has the 
nationality of its state of incorporation […] by foreign control […] This 
exception to the general rule applies only in the context of an agreement 
between the parties”. (Emphasis added) 
18
 Ibid. at 30: “Under the well established presumption expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, the state of incorporation, not the nationality of the 
controlling shareholders or siège social, thus defines “investors” of 
Lithuania under Article 1(2)(b) of the BIT” 
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lifting process, although it lies on a municipal law rationale, was 
“equally admissible to play a similar role in international law”. The 
veil, that is, could be lifted “for instance, to prevent the misuse of the 
privileges of legal personality, as in certain cases of fraud or malfeasance, to 
protect third persons such as a creditor or purchaser, or to prevent the evasion 
of legal requirements or of obligations”.19 In other words, although the 
tribunal would have most likely considered the controlling 
nationality of the claimant should any fraud allegation had been 
confirmed, the absence of fraud provided no ground for such a 
test to be applied and justified complete reliance on the place of 
incorporation. The arbitrators emphasised that (a) the respondent 
had not demonstrated that the claimant had engaged in any of the 
types of conduct described in Barcelona Traction;20 (b) a genuine 
$170,000 worth investment had been realised; (c) the parent 
company had been created six years before the relevant BIT 
entered into force 21 and; (d) the lack of substantial business 
activity would have no legal ground in the absence of a “denial of 
benefit” clause (found in the Energy Charter for instance) in the 
relevant BIT.22 Thus, the tribunal excluded the possibility that the 
entity was exclusively established in Lithuania by a Ukrainian 
investor to unduly benefit from the BIT and discarded any fraud 
allegation,23 together with the necessity to have recourse to a 
controlling nationality test. Characterising its reasoning as 
“consistent with modern BIT practice and satisf(ying) the 
objective requirements of Article 25 of the Convention”,24 it 
accordingly recognised the Lithuanian nationality of the Ukrainian 
subsidiary. 
- - - 
While the BIT in Tokios Tokelés used the place of 
incorporation as the main nationality-determinant, the TSA 
Spectrum BIT rather considered “natural persons having the nationality 
of that Contracting Party” in the first place.25 Relying on a 
controlling nationality test, the host-state refused to grant the 
                                                     
19
 Ibid. at 54, emphasis added. In particular, the Court noted, “[t]he wealth 
of practice already accumulated on the subject in municipal law indicates 
that the veil is lifted, for instance, to prevent the misuse of the privileges 
of legal personality, as in certain cases of fraud or malfeasance, to protect 
third persons such as a creditor or purchaser, or to prevent the evasion of 
legal requirements or of obligations.”  
20
 Ibid. at 55 
21
 Ibid. at 56 
22
 Ibid. at 36 
23
 Ibid. at 56 
24
 Ibid. at 52 
25
 TSA Spectrum v Argentina  at 21, emphasis added 
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claimant the benefit of ‘foreign control’ because their Dutch 
nationality (conditioning the protection under the Netherlands – 
Argentina treaty) was not substantiated. Recalling the importance 
of article 25(2)(b) ICSID and the BIT requirements, the claimant 
oppositely relied on the place of incorporation test. It argued that 
(a) TSI, by owning 100% of TSA’s shares met the “control” 
criterion,26 (b) TSA only needed to demonstrate that it was 
“controlled, directly or indirectly, by a national of the 
Netherlands, regardless of where it (was) located”,27 since 
Argentina and the Netherlands had agreed that TSA should be 
treated as a national of another contracting state,28 and (c) there 
was no overall necessity to look for the nationality of the 
“ultimate controller”, since the BIT imposed no such 
requirement.29 In other words, although the place of 
incorporation test would have most likely granted the investor the 
nationality of the other Contracting Party, Argentina relied on the 
control test to deny the investor such benefits, and contended 
that TSI only represented “a vehicle company without any real 
control over TSA, used by the true controllers of TSA to carry out 
their investment while benefiting of the BIT”.30 
By contrast with Tokios Tokelés, the TSA Spectrum tribunal 
lifted the veil to confirm or dissipate doubts as to the controlling 
nationality of the claimant. The tribunal suggested that “only a 
genuinely foreign investment should be protected by the ICSID 
mechanism”.31 At the same time, the panel admitted that in many 
cases a corporate branch could constitute a mere “vehicle 
company used by the true controllers […] to carry out their 
investment” granted increased interest to the controlling 
nationality test.32  
The TSA Spectrum tribunal, furthermore, applied Barcelona 
Traction to its own circumstances. As in Tokios Tokelés, it found 
that “in international law, it is allowed to pierce the corporate veil, 
for instance to prevent the misuse of the privileges of legal 
personality or to prevent the evasion of legal requirements or 
obligations. In the Tokios Tokelés case, the possibility of piercing 
the corporate veil of a Dutch company was analysed, but the 
tribunal did not allow this to be done, since it found none of the 
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 Ibid. at 124 
27
 Ibid. at 126 
28
 Ibid. at 125 
29
 Ibid. at 127 
30
 Ibid. emphasis added 
31
 Ibid. at 118-120 
32
 Ibid. at 118-120 
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grounds indicated in the Barcelona Traction case to be present. This 
case differs from the present one, since there was no ostensible 
attempt to conceal the true controller of the company”.33 Having 
applied both the interpretation of Article 25 ICSID and the fraud 
justification, it confirmed that “TSI was controlled by an 
Argentinean national […] who held, directly or indirectly, a 
majority of its shares (so that) TSA was not under foreign control 
and (could) not be treated as a national of another Contracting 
State”.34  
Arguments on lifting the veil 
While relying on the place of incorporation grants investors 
of third states the ability to benefit from various BITs, TSA 
Spectrum might erect control tests as a limitation to ‘BIT-shopping’ 
practices. Although the issue relates to a matter of policy to be 
discussed by treaty negotiators, the opposite findings of Tokios 
Tokelés and TSA Spectrum nevertheless suggest that arbitrators 
might increasingly use their interpretative duties to establish their 
jurisdiction over future disputes.  
Veil lifting under ICSID arbitration can therefore be 
discussed from different perspectives. The distinctions opposing 
Tokios Tokelés and TSA Spectrum can be considered, and the 
dissenting opinions attached to the cases bring interesting 
insights. Overall, two questions could be formulated. First, does 
ICSID arbitrators’ jurisdiction encompass lifting the corporate 
veil in the absence of an explicit authorisation to do so in the 
Convention? Second, notwithstanding policy-oriented ‘BIT-
shopping’ discussions, should the real source of authority of the 
investment be looked for in claims opposing states to their own 
nationals? 
First, does ICSID arbitrators’ jurisdiction encompass lifting 
the corporate veil in the absence of an explicit authorisation to do 
so in the Convention? Both decisions suggest opposite answers. 
The Tokios Tokelés interpretation of Article 25 ICSID, on the one 
hand, led the arbitrators to say that “the Convention does not 
define the method for determining the nationality of juridical 
entities, leaving this task to the reasonable discretion of the 
contracting parties”.35 Rejecting the supremacy of the controlling 
test over the place of incorporation, the tribunal therefore 
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 Ibid. at 117, 118 
34
 Ibid. at 159 
35
 Tokios Tokelés, Decision on Jurisdiction (2004)  at 24 
11 
 
ignored the existence of a controlling nationality requirement in 
the relevant BIT. The decision, in addition, was justified on the 
ground that veil lifting in Barcelona Traction only applied in 
fraudulent circumstances, which in this case were not 
substantiated. A contrario, the later ground implicitly suggests that 
the tribunal might have applied a controlling nationality test if 
fraud had been proven.  
The TSA Spectrum tribunal, on the other hand, interpreted 
Article 25 by emphasising the importance of ‘foreign control’. By 
extending ICSID jurisdiction to local entities submitted to 
‘foreign control’, Article 25 was in practice specifically designed 
“in order to pierce the corporate veil and reach for the reality 
behind the cover of nationality”, as a systematic procedure 
notwithstanding the presence or absence of fraudulent 
circumstances.36 The decision states: 
143. The question as to whether, or to what 
extent, the corporate veil should be 
pierced or lifted in the application of 
Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention 
presents itself in a different light and can 
lead to different solutions, depending on 
whether the case falls under the first or 
the second clause of this provision.  
144. The first clause of Article 25(2)(b) 
mentions only the “nationality” of a 
Contracting State other than the State 
party to the dispute. In other words, it uses 
as a criterion the formal legal concept of 
nationality, which for legal persons is 
determined by one of the two generally 
accepted criteria of the place of 
incorporation or the seat (siège social) of 
the corporation. There is no reference here 
to “control”, whether foreign or other, nor 
any mention of “piercing” or looking 
beyond this nationality. 
147. The situation is different, however, when 
it comes to the second clause of Article 
25(2)(b) of the Convention. Here, the text 
itself allows the parties to agree to lift the 
corporate veil, but only “because of 
foreign control”, which justifies, but at 
the same time conditions, this exception 
[…] the existence and materiality of this 
foreign control have to be objectively 
proven in order for them to establish 
ICSID jurisdiction by their agreement”37 
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 TSA Spectrum v Argentina  at 139-141 
37
 Emphasis added 
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Hence, the cases suggest that, where a local entity is to be 
treated as a national of the other Contracting State because of 
‘foreign control’, arbitrators’ jurisdiction might encompass lifting 
the corporate veil. That being said, Tokios Tokelés arbitrators 
found that such a test is not deemed automatic but triggered by 
the sole confirmation of fraudulent circumstances. TSA Spectrum 
rather proposes that control tests might be implied under Article 
25 ICSID whenever BIT protection would be claimed on the 
ground of ‘foreign control’.38 Both decisions, however, suggest 
that verified fraudulent circumstances would furthermore entitle 
arbitrators to lift the veil in order to determine the nationality of 
the ‘true controller’. 
Second, could a claim in which an investor incorporated in 
the territory of the other contracting party but which controlling 
nationality is the one of the responding state party be considered 
as falling under Article 25 ICSID by way of its sole place of 
incorporation? In other words, would arbitrators have 
jurisdictions over a claim between a state and a national of this 
state controlling an ‘investment vehicle’ incorporated abroad, or 
would such a situation rather justify arbitrators’ verification of the 
controlling nationality of the investor as discussed in the 
dissenting opinions attached to both cases? In Tokios Tokelés, 
Ukraine emphasised that a finding of jurisdiction excluding a 
control test would be “tantamount to allowing Ukrainian 
nationals to pursue international arbitration against their own 
government (and therefore be) inconsistent with the object and 
purpose of the ICSID Convention”.39 The tribunal thereby left 
unconsidered the growing debate as to whether a national of a 
country should be able to benefit from BIT protection while 
investing in his own country through the use of an intermediary 
in a second state. Two opposite arguments can be brought to the 
debate. 
Arbitrator Aldonas robustly criticised the tribunal’s piercing 
of the veil in TSA and defended the primacy of states’ contractual 
freedom. He argued that “a good faith interpretation of Article 25 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms compels the 
opposite result. Article 25(2)(b) makes the determination of which 
juridical persons may gain access to ICSID jurisdiction by virtue 
of their “foreign control” expressly dependent on an agreement 
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 TSA Spectrum v Argentina  at 147 
39
 Tokios Tokelés, Decision on Jurisdiction (2004)  at 22 
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between “the parties,” not some putative “objective test”.40 In his 
view, furthermore, “the negotiating history of Article 25 
reinforces that conclusion. […] Article 25 does not define the 
term ‘foreign national’ for purposes of the Convention. Indeed, 
the drafters of the Convention expressly rejected attempts to 
provide a more formalistic reading of the term like that suggested 
by the majority in favor of giving the parties to any investment 
agreement the widest possible latitude to agree on the meaning of 
‘nationality”.41 Although the investment at stake was “indisputably 
and totally in the hands of, and controlled by, Ukrainian citizens 
and interests”,42 the majority in Tokios Tokelés similarly valued the 
contractual liberty of the parties. In addition, it found that the 
investment had been made by a Lithuanian corporation whatever 
the origin of its capital and the nationality of its managers, so that 
“the origin of the capital (was found) not relevant to the existence 
of an investment”. 43 
The TSA Spectrum decision, by contrast, criticised the Tokios 
Tokelés “strict constructionist” interpretation, which went “against 
common sense in some circumstances, especially when the 
formal nationality covers a corporate entity controlled directly or 
indirectly by persons of the same nationality as the host State”.44 
The TSA majority, therefore, followed the dissent in Tokios 
Tokelés on this point. As President Weil’s dissenting opinion in 
Tokios Tokelés  formulates, 
“To decide the jurisdictional issue the 
Decision should, therefore, have checked first 
whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction under 
Article 25 of the Convention—interpreted, as 
the Decision recalls, in light of its object and 
purpose—and then, in a second stage, whether 
it has jurisdiction also under the bilateral 
investment treaty. It is only if the tribunal had 
reached the conclusion that it has jurisdiction 
under the Convention that it would have had to 
examine whether it has jurisdiction also under 
the BIT. This, however, is not how the 
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Decision proceeds. It states that “we begin our 
analysis of this jurisdictional requirement by 
underscoring the deference this Tribunal owes 
to the definition of corporate nationality 
contained in the agreement between the 
Contracting Parties, in this case, the Ukraine-
Lithuania BIT.” And this is what it does”.45 
Suggesting that disputes might not be ‘international’ where 
the controlling nationality of a foreign entity would be the same 
as the responding state’s, President Weil furthermore argued that 
the Tokios Tokelés tribunal failed to recall that the “ICSID 
arbitration mechanism is meant for international investment 
disputes, that is to say, for disputes between States and foreign 
investors”.46 The effect of the rule set out in the following quote 
of the decision, would, indeed, promote investors’ right to rely on 
incorporation tests to benefit from more favourable treaty terms: 
Even assuming, arguendo, that all of the 
capital used by the Claimant to invest in 
Ukraine had its ultimate origin in Ukraine, the 
resulting investment would not be outside the 
scope of the Convention. The Claimant made 
an investment for the purposes of the 
Convention when it decided to deploy capital 
under its control in the territory of Ukraine 
instead of investing it elsewhere. The origin of 
the capital is not relevant to the existence of an 
investment. […] the ICSID Convention does 
not require an “investment” to be financed 
from capital of any particular origin […] The 
origin of the capital used to acquire these 
assets is not relevant to the question of 
jurisdiction under the Convention.47 
The suggestion that the origin of an investment “is not 
relevant to the question of jurisdiction under the Convention” 
can nevertheless be debated. On the one hand, the raison d'être of 
‘bilateral’ investment treaties is the willingness of states to enter 
into bilateral agreements in order to specifically protect the 
investments originating from selected countries. The origins of an 
investment as a result, could be interpreted as an important 
element which should be considered by arbitrators while 
establishing their jurisdiction over a dispute. Therefore, 
controlling nationality tests would make sense as far as the 
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preservation of ICSID jurisdiction for disputes between a 
‘Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State’ is 
concerned. On the other hand, the existence of place of 
incorporation requirements in these same treaties also shows that 
BITs can be concluded to attract third-state investors, somehow 
giving political justifications and legal grounding to ‘BIT-
shopping’ practices.  
Elaborating on the meaning of ‘international’ disputes, 
some arbitral comments nevertheless suggest that the origin of 
the investment might be essential to the finding of jurisdiction 
and justify recourse to control-based nationality tests in such 
circumstances. The TSA decision, for instance, cites Professor 
Schreuer’s rhetorical question: “is it sufficient for nationals of 
non-Contracting States or even of the host State to set up a 
company of convenience in a Contracting State to create the 
semblance of appropriate foreign control? […] the better 
approach would appear to be a realistic look at the true controller 
thereby blocking access to the Centre for juridical persons that 
are controlled directly or indirectly by nationals of non-
Contracting States or nationals of the host State”.48 Relating the 
‘international’ nature of an investment with the notion of ‘foreign 
control’, President Weil similarly notes that “it is because of their 
international character, and with a view to stimulating private 
international investment, that these disputes may be settled, if the 
parties so desire, by an international judicial body [so that] the 
ICSID mechanism is not meant for investment disputes between 
States and their own nationals”.49 Finally, the findings in the more 
recent Phoenix case50 also suggest that ICSID jurisdiction should 
remain exclusive to “Bona fide investment(s)”51 characterised by the 
verified foreign controlling nationality of the investors by contrast 
with what the tribunal called “national investments”. The Phoenix 
tribunal, indeed, confirmed that, in cases of “abuse of a corporate 
structure, the tribunal should look beyond the apparent facts and 
lift the corporate veil”.52 Said the tribunal, “it is common 
knowledge that the purpose of the ICSID system is not to protect 
nationals of a Contracting State against their own State: the 
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system was clearly ‘designed to facilitate the settlement of 
disputes between States and foreign investors’ with a view to 
‘stimulating a larger flow of private international capital into those 
countries which wish to attract it’. It is settled jurisprudence that a 
national investment cannot give rise to ICSID arbitration, which is reserved 
to international investments and that an invalid ICSID clause signed by a 
national cannot be transformed into a valid ICSID clause by assignment to a 
foreign investor”.53 
 
 
Conclusion 
Several points can be emphasised in conclusion. First, while 
the Tokios Tokelés arbitrators relied on incorporation and solely 
considered control with regard to fraud, the TSA Spectrum tribunal 
found that control tests should be relied upon on the ground of 
Article 25(2)(b) ICSID as a means to establish arbitrators’ 
jurisdiction under the Convention where ‘foreign control’ is 
considered. This suggests that veil lifting might become an 
automatic procedure and objective test intended to verify the 
identity of “the true controller” where ICSID protection is 
granted to a local entity subjected to ‘foreign control’. 
Second, the question as to whether arbitrators should have 
jurisdiction over a claim between a state and an investor whose 
controlling nationality is the one of the responding state remains 
debated. Some, on the one hand, promote a narrowed conception 
of ‘international investments’ and ‘foreign control’ based on 
controlling nationalities. Others, on the other hand, favour 
incorporation tests and write that because ICSID practice is not 
built upon a system of precedent, the nature of foreign control 
might remain unspecified as understood in Tokios Tokelés. The 
TSA award, in turn, might remain isolated.54 It is also said that 
after TSA Spectrum, investor might alternatively bring disputes 
under the UNCITRAL Rules “since these Rules are not drafted 
specifically with investment treaty arbitration in mind, (and) do 
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not include any specific limitations in respect of nationality”.55 
Overall, these varying interpretations demonstrate how disturbing 
the TSA award is with regard to the so-called ‘BIT-shopping’ 
practices originating from generalised reliance on place of 
incorporation nationality tests. Having said that, while relying on 
controlling nationalities as a systematic procedure would 
undoubtedly infringe the contracting states’ agreement to 
consider investors by way of incorporation tests, the willingness 
of states to enter into bilateral agreements to protect specifically 
the investments originating from selected countries might remain 
a raison-d’être of bilateral investment treaties. Accordingly, 
although ‘BIT-shopping’ discussions constitute policy debates 
which should be left for treaty negotiators to decide upon, the 
Tokios Tokelés and TSA Spectrum debates nevertheless indicates 
that the origins of an investment might be increasingly considered 
while establishing arbitrators’ jurisdiction over disputes with a 
view to avoid opposing states to their own nationals in 
forthcoming international arbitrations. 
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